In this work, we consider the two-party setting and assume that honest parties may \emph{erase} data. We show that in this model it is possible to securely compute any two-party functionality in the presence of \emph{adaptive semi-honest adversaries}. Furthermore, our protocol remains secure under concurrent general composition (meaning that it remains secure irrespective of the other protocols running together with it). Our protocol is based on Yao's garbled-circuit construction and, importantly, is as efficient as the analogous protocol for static corruptions. We argue that the model of adaptive corruptions with erasures has been unjustifiably neglected and that it deserves much more attention.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / adaptive security, secure computation Publication Info: An extended abstract appeared in CT-RSA 2009; this is the full version. Date: received 14 Jan 2009, last revised 25 Dec 2013 Contact author: lindell at cs biu ac il Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Note: Previous versions of this work contained an error regarding the \emph{adaptive security of garbled circuits} \cite{BHR}. This error is fixed here. Version: 20131225:094433 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2009/031 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion