Collision Attacks on NaSHA-384/512

Zhimin Li; Licheng Wang; Daofeng Li; Yixian Yang

Paper 2009/026

Collision Attacks on NaSHA-384/512

Zhimin Li, Licheng Wang, Daofeng Li, and Yixian Yang

Abstract

NaSHA is a family of hash functions submitted by Markovski and Mileva as a SHA-3 candidate. In this paper, we present a collision attack on the hash function NaSHA for the output sizes 384-bit and 512-bit. This attack is based on the the weakness in the generate course of the state words and the fact that the quasigroup operation used in the compression function is only determined by partial state words. Its time complexity is about $2^{128}$ with negligible memory and its probability is more than $(1- \frac{2}{{2^{64} - 1}})^2$ ($\gg \frac{1}{2}$). This is currently by far the best known cryptanalysis result on this SHA-3 candidate.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Hash function NaSHA-384 NaSHA-512 collision attack
Contact author(s): lizhimin1981 @ gmail com
History: 2009-06-16: last of 2 revisions; 2009-01-14: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2009/026
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/026,
      author = {Zhimin Li and Licheng Wang and Daofeng Li and Yixian Yang},
      title = {Collision Attacks on {NaSHA}-384/512},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/026},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/026}
}