Paper 2008/497
On the Correctness of An Approach Against Side-channel attacks
Peng Wang, Dengguo Feng, Wenling Wu, and Liting Zhang
Abstract
Side-channel attacks are a very powerful cryptanalytic technique. Li and Gu [ProvSec'07] proposed an approach against side-channel attacks, which states that a symmetric encryption scheme is IND-secure in side-channel model, if it is IND-secure in black-box model and there is no adversary who can recover the whole key of the scheme computationally in side-channel model, i.e. WKR-SCA ^ IND -> IND-SCA. Our researches show that it is not the case. We analyze notions of security against key recovery attacks and security against distinguishing attacks, and then construct a scheme which is WKR-SCA-secure and IND-secure, but not IND-SCA-secure in the same side-channel environment. Furthermore, even if the scheme is secure again partial key recovery attacks in side-channel model, this approach still does not hold true.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Provable securitySide-channel attackSymmetric encryption
- Contact author(s)
- wp @ is ac cn
- History
- 2008-12-02: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/497
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/497,
author = {Peng Wang and Dengguo Feng and Wenling Wu and Liting Zhang},
title = {On the Correctness of An Approach Against Side-channel attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/497},
year = {2008},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/497}
}
