Specifically, we prove a protocol in which every tag transmits the same constant message to not be location private in the proposed model. Then we prove a protocol in which a tag’s identity is transmitted in clear text to be weakly location private in the model. Finally, we consider a protocol with known weaknesses with respect to location privacy and show it to be location private in the model.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Location privacy, untraceability, RFID Publication Info: An abridged version appeared in Information Processing Letters 110(2) (2009), pages 57–61. Date: received 12 Nov 2008, last revised 7 Dec 2009 Contact author: sasa radomirovic at uni lu Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20091207:181820 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2008/477 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion