Paper 2008/477
On a New Formal Proof Model for RFID Location Privacy (Extended Version)
Ton van Deursen and Sasa Radomirovic
Abstract
We discuss a recently proposed formal proof model for RFID location privacy. We show that protocols which intuitively and in several other models are considered not to be location private, are provably location private in this model. Conversely, we also show that protocols which obviously are location private, are not considered location private in this model. Specifically, we prove a protocol in which every tag transmits the same constant message to not be location private in the proposed model. Then we prove a protocol in which a tag’s identity is transmitted in clear text to be weakly location private in the model. Finally, we consider a protocol with known weaknesses with respect to location privacy and show it to be location private in the model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. An abridged version appeared in Information Processing Letters 110(2) (2009), pages 57–61.
- Keywords
- Location privacyuntraceabilityRFID
- Contact author(s)
- sasa radomirovic @ uni lu
- History
- 2009-12-07: revised
- 2008-11-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/477
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/477,
author = {Ton van Deursen and Sasa Radomirovic},
title = {On a New Formal Proof Model for {RFID} Location Privacy (Extended Version)},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/477},
year = {2008},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/477}
}
