Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/477

On a New Formal Proof Model for RFID Location Privacy (Extended Version)

Ton van Deursen and Sasa Radomirovic

Abstract: We discuss a recently proposed formal proof model for RFID location privacy. We show that protocols which intuitively and in several other models are considered not to be location private, are provably location private in this model. Conversely, we also show that protocols which obviously are location private, are not considered location private in this model.

Specifically, we prove a protocol in which every tag transmits the same constant message to not be location private in the proposed model. Then we prove a protocol in which a tag’s identity is transmitted in clear text to be weakly location private in the model. Finally, we consider a protocol with known weaknesses with respect to location privacy and show it to be location private in the model.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Location privacy, untraceability, RFID

Publication Info: An abridged version appeared in Information Processing Letters 110(2) (2009), pages 57–61.

Date: received 12 Nov 2008, last revised 7 Dec 2009

Contact author: sasa radomirovic at uni lu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20091207:181820 (All versions of this report)

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]