Unfair noisy channels, introduced by Damgard, Kilian and Salvail [Eurocrypt '99], reduce these limitations: They give the adversary an unfair advantage over the honest player, and therefore weaken the security requirements on the noisy channel. However, this model still has many shortcomings: For example, the adversary's advantage is only allowed to have a very special form, and no error is allowed in the implementation.
In this paper we generalize the idea of unfair noisy channels. We introduce two new models of cryptographic noisy channels that we call the weak erasure channel and the weak binary symmetric channel, and show how they can be used to implement oblivious transfer. Our models are more general and use much weaker assumptions than unfair noisy channels, which makes implementation a more realistic prospect. For example, these are the first models that allows the parameters to come from experimental evidence.Category / Keywords: oblivious transfer, bit commitment, noisy channels Publication Info: TCC 2009 Date: received 30 Sep 2008, last revised 9 Apr 2009 Contact author: j wullschleger at bristol ac uk Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Note: Full version of the TCC 2009 paper. Version: 20090409:130543 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2008/420 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion