Ensuring security in presence of mistyping is subtle. We show mistyping-related limitations of previous KE definitions and constructions.
We concentrate on the practical two-factor authenticated KE setting where servers exchange keys with clients, who use short passwords (memorized) and long cryptographic keys (stored on a card). Our work is thus a natural generalization of Halevi-Krawczyk and Kolesnikov-Rackoff. We discuss the challenges that arise due to mistyping. We propose the first KE definitions in this setting, and formally discuss their guarantees. We present efficient KE protocols and prove their security.
Category / Keywords: foundations / Key exchange, definition, combined keys, password, biometric Publication Info: ICALP 2008 Date: received 28 Sep 2008, last revised 8 Oct 2008 Contact author: kolesnikov at research bell-labs com Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation Note: This revision fixes a broken pdf file. No content changes. Version: 20081008:171758 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2008/413 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion