Paper 2008/407

Indifferentiable Security Analysis of choppfMD, chopMD, a chopMDP, chopWPH, chopNI, chopEMD, chopCS, and chopESh Hash Domain Extensions

Donghoon Chang, Jaechul Sung, Seokhie Hong, and Sangjin Lee

Abstract

We provide simple and unified indifferentiable security analyses of choppfMD, chopMD, a chopMDP (where the permutation $P$ is to be xored with any non-zero constant.), chopWPH (the chopped version of Wide-Pipe Hash proposed in \cite{Lucks05}), chopEMD, chopNI, chopCS, chopESh hash domain extensions. Even though there are security analysis of them in the case of no-bit chopping (i.e., $s=0$), there is no unified way to give security proofs. All our proofs in this paper follow the technique introduced in \cite{BeDaPeAs08}. These proofs are simple and easy to follow.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Hash FunctionDomain ExtensionRandom OracleIndifferentiability
Contact author(s)
pointchang @ gmail com
History
2008-12-12: last of 2 revisions
2008-09-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/407
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/407,
      author = {Donghoon Chang and Jaechul Sung and Seokhie Hong and Sangjin Lee},
      title = {Indifferentiable Security Analysis of choppfMD, chopMD, a chopMDP, chopWPH, chopNI, chopEMD, chopCS, and chopESh Hash Domain Extensions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/407},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/407}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/407}
}
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