Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/407

Indifferentiable Security Analysis of choppfMD, chopMD, a chopMDP, chopWPH, chopNI, chopEMD, chopCS, and chopESh Hash Domain Extensions

Donghoon Chang and Jaechul Sung and Seokhie Hong and Sangjin Lee

Abstract: We provide simple and unified indifferentiable security analyses of choppfMD, chopMD, a chopMDP (where the permutation $P$ is to be xored with any non-zero constant.), chopWPH (the chopped version of Wide-Pipe Hash proposed in \cite{Lucks05}), chopEMD, chopNI, chopCS, chopESh hash domain extensions. Even though there are security analysis of them in the case of no-bit chopping (i.e., $s=0$), there is no unified way to give security proofs. All our proofs in this paper follow the technique introduced in \cite{BeDaPeAs08}. These proofs are simple and easy to follow.

Category / Keywords: Hash Function, Domain Extension, Random Oracle, Indifferentiability

Date: received 23 Sep 2008, last revised 12 Dec 2008

Contact author: pointchang at gmail com

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20081212:205707 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2008/407

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