Paper 2008/406

An asymptotically optimal RFID protocol against relay attacks

Gildas Avoine and Aslan Tchamkerten

Abstract

Relay attacks are a major concern for RFID systems: during an authentication process an adversary transparently relays messages between a verifier and a remote legitimate prover. We present an authentication protocol suited for RFID systems. Our solution is the first that prevents relay attacks without degrading the authentication security level: it minimizes the probability that the verifier accepts a fake proof of identity, whether or not a relay attack occurs.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
authenticationproximity checkrelay attackRFID
Contact author(s)
tcham @ mit edu
History
2008-09-24: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/406
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/406,
      author = {Gildas Avoine and Aslan Tchamkerten},
      title = {An asymptotically optimal RFID protocol against relay attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/406},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/406}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/406}
}
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