Paper 2008/402
Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Curry and Flurry using Correlated Messages
Jean-Charles Faugère and Ludovic Perret
Abstract
In \cite{BPW}, Buchmann, Pyshkin and Weinmann have described two families of Feistel and SPN block ciphers called Flurry and Curry respectively. These two families of ciphers are fully parametrizable and have a sound design strategy against basic statistical attacks; i.e. linear and differential attacks. The encryption process can be easily described by a set of algebraic equations. These ciphers are then targets of choices for algebraic attacks. In particular, the key recovery problem has been reduced to changing the order of a Groebner basis \cite{BPW,BPWext}. This attack - although being more efficient than linear and differential attacks - remains quite limited. The purpose of this paper is to overcome this limitation by using a small number of suitably chosen pairs of message/ciphertext for improving algebraic attacks. It turns out that this approach permits to go one step further in the (algebraic) cryptanalysis of Flurry and \textbf{Curry}. To explain the behavior of our attack, we have established an interesting connection between algebraic attacks and high order differential cryptanalysis \cite{Lai}. From extensive experiments, we estimate that our approach, that we can call an ``algebraic-high order differential" cryptanalysis, is polynomial when the Sbox is a power function. As a proof of concept, we have been able to break Flurry -- up to $8$ rounds -- in few hours.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- algebraic cryptanalysisblock ciphersGroebner basesF5 algorithm
- Contact author(s)
- ludovic perret @ lip6 fr
- History
- 2008-09-24: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/402
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/402, author = {Jean-Charles Faugère and Ludovic Perret}, title = {Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Curry and Flurry using Correlated Messages}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/402}, year = {2008}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/402} }