Paper 2008/344

Authenticated Key Exchange Secure under the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption

Jooyoung Lee and Je Hong Park

Abstract

In this paper, we present a new authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocol and prove its security under the random oracle assumption and the computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) assumption. In the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model, there has been no known AKE protocol based on the CDH assumption. Our protocol, called NAXOS+, is obtained by slightly modifying the NAXOS protocol proposed by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin. We establish a formal security proof of NAXOS+ in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model using as a main tool the trapdoor test presented by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
authenticated key exchangetrapdoor test
Contact author(s)
jlee05 @ ensec re kr
History
2008-08-11: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/344
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/344,
      author = {Jooyoung Lee and Je Hong Park},
      title = {Authenticated Key Exchange Secure under the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/344},
      year = {2008},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/344}
}
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