Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/338
An improvement of discrete Tardos fingerprinting codes
Koji Nuida and Satoshi Fujitsu and Manabu Hagiwara and Takashi Kitagawa and Hajime Watanabe and Kazuto Ogawa and Hideki Imai
Abstract: It has been known that the code lengths of Tardos's collusion-secure fingerprinting codes are of theoretically minimal order with respect to the number of adversarial users (pirates). However, the code lengths can be further reduced, as some preceding studies on Tardos's codes already revealed. In this article we improve a recent discrete variant of Tardos's codes, and give a security proof of our codes under an assumption weaker than the original assumption (Marking Assumption).
Our analysis shows that our codes have significantly shorter lengths than Tardos's codes. For example, in a practical setting, the code lengths of our codes are about 3.01%, 4.28%, and 4.81% of Tardos's codes if the numbers of pirates are 2, 4, and 6, respectively.
Category / Keywords: fingerprinting
Publication Info: Designs, Codes and Cryptography, vol.52, no.3, 2009, pp.339--362
Date: received 3 Aug 2008, last revised 16 May 2009
Contact author: k nuida at aist go jp
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: A part of this work was presented at 17th Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms, and Error Correcting Codes (AAECC-17), Bangalore, India, December 16--20, 2007.
Version: 20090516:163825 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2008/338
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