Paper 2008/297

Attack on Kang et al.'s Identity-Based Strong Designated Verifier Signature Scheme

Hongzhen Du and Qiaoyan Wen

Abstract

In this paper, we present a universal forgery attack on Kang et al.'s identity-based strong designated verifier signature (IBSDVS) scheme. We show anyone can forge a valid IBSDVS on an arbitrary message without the knowledge of the private key of either the signer or the designated verifier. Moreover, we point out that Kang et al.'s scheme does not satisfy the properties of strongness and non-delegatability. At last, an improved IBSDVS scheme for Kang et al.'s scheme is presented, and it is provably secure and achieves all the requirements for an IBSDVS.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
designated verifier signaturebilinear pairingscryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
duhongzhen @ gmail com
History
2008-09-15: revised
2008-07-04: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/297
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/297,
      author = {Hongzhen Du and Qiaoyan Wen},
      title = {Attack on Kang et al.'s Identity-Based Strong Designated Verifier Signature Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/297},
      year = {2008},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/297}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.