Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/293
Maximizing data survival in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks against a focused mobile adversary
Roberto Di Pietro and Luigi V. Mancini and Claudio Soriente and Angelo Spognardi and Gene Tsudik
Abstract: Some sensor network settings involve disconnected or
unattended operation with periodic visits by a mobile sink.
An unattended sensor network operating in a hostile environment can
collect data that represents a high-value target for the adversary.
Since an unattended sensor can not immediately off-load sensed data to
a safe external entity (such as a sink), the adversary can easily
mount a focused attack aiming to erase or modify target data.
To maximize chances of data survival, sensors must collaboratively attempt to mislead the adversary and hide the location, the origin and the contents of collected data.
In this paper, we focus on applications of well-known security
techniques to maximize chances of data survival in unattended sensor
networks, where sensed data can not be off-loaded to a sink in real time.
Our investigation yields some interesting insights and surprising results.
The highlights of our work are:
(1) thorough exploration of the data survival challenge,
(2) exploration of the design space for possible solutions,
(3) construction of several practical and effective techniques,
and (4) their evaluation.
Category / Keywords: applications / Unattended-WSN, mobile adversary, data survival, security
Date: received 30 Jun 2008, last revised 6 Nov 2008
Contact author: angelo spognardi at inrialpes fr
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20081106:123825 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2008/293
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