Universally Composable Security Analysis of TLS---Secure Sessions with Handshake and Record Layer Protocols

Sebastian Gajek; Mark Manulis; Olivier Pereira; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi; Jörg Schwenk

Paper 2008/251

Universally Composable Security Analysis of TLS---Secure Sessions with Handshake and Record Layer Protocols

Sebastian Gajek, Mark Manulis, Olivier Pereira, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Jörg Schwenk

Abstract

We present a security analysis of the complete TLS protocol in the Universal Composable security framework. This analysis evaluates the composition of key exchange functionalities realized by the TLS handshake with the message transmission of the TLS record layer to emulate secure communication sessions and is based on the adaption of the secure channel model from Canetti and Krawczyk to the setting where peer identities are not necessarily known prior the protocol invocation and may remain undisclosed. Our analysis shows that TLS, including the Diffie-Hellman and key transport suites in the uni-directional and bi-directional models of authentication, securely emulates secure communication sessions.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Universal Composability TLS SSL key exchange secure sessions
Contact author(s): sebastian gajek @ nds rub de
History: 2008-07-03: last of 2 revisions; 2008-06-03: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2008/251
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/251,
      author = {Sebastian Gajek and Mark Manulis and Olivier Pereira and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Jörg Schwenk},
      title = {Universally Composable Security Analysis of {TLS}---Secure Sessions with Handshake and Record Layer Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/251},
      year = {2008},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/251}
}