Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/193
A Tamper-Evident Voting Machine Resistant to Covert Channels
Wei Han and Tao Hao and Dong Zheng and Ke-fei Chen and Xiaofeng Chen
Abstract: To provide a high level of security guarantee cryptography is introduced into the design of the voting machine. The voting machine based on cryptography is vulnerable to attacks through covert channels. An adversary may inject malicious codes into the voting machine and make it leak vote information unnoticeably by exploiting the randomness used in encryptions and zero-knowledge proofs. In this paper a voting machine resistant to covert channels is designed. It has the following properties: Firstly, it is tamper-evident. The randomness used by the voting machine is generated by the election authority. The inconsistent use of the randomness can be detected by the voter from examining a destroyable verification code. Even if malicious codes are run in the voting machine attacks through subliminal channels are thwarted. Next, it is voter-verifiable. The voter has the ability to verify if the ballot cast by the machine is consistent with her intent without doing complicated cryptographic computation. Finally, the voting system is receipt-free. Vote-buying and coercion are prevented.
Category / Keywords: applications / electronic voting, covert channel, tamper-evident, receipt-free
Publication Info: This paper was included in the conference proceedings of ProvSec 2008, LNCS 5324. So it was withdrawn.
Date: received 29 Apr 2008, last revised 29 Aug 2008, withdrawn 2 Nov 2008
Contact author: china_hanwei at hotmail com
Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)
Version: 20081103:040614 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2008/193
Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion
[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]