Paper 2008/166
Algebraic Attacks on the Crypto-1 Stream Cipher in MiFare Classic and Oyster Cards
Nicolas T. Courtois, Karsten Nohl, and Sean O'Neil
Abstract
MiFare Crypto 1 is a lightweight stream cipher used in London's Oyster card, Netherland's OV-Chipcard, US Boston's CharlieCard, and in numerous wireless access control and ticketing systems worldwide. Recently, researchers have been able to recover this algorithm by reverse engineering. We have examined MiFare from the point of view of the so called "algebraic attacks". We can recover the full 48-bit key of MiFare algorithm in 200 seconds on a PC, given 1 known IV (from one single encryption). The security of this cipher is therefore close to zero. This is particularly shocking, given the fact that, according to the Dutch press, 1 billion of MiFare Classic chips are used worldwide, including in many governmental security systems.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Mifare Crypto 1 algorithmstream ciphersalgebraic cryptanalysisBoolean functionsGröbner basesSAT solvers
- Contact author(s)
- n courtois @ ucl ac uk
- History
- 2008-04-14: revised
- 2008-04-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/166
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/166,
author = {Nicolas T. Courtois and Karsten Nohl and Sean O'Neil},
title = {Algebraic Attacks on the Crypto-1 Stream Cipher in {MiFare} Classic and Oyster Cards},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/166},
year = {2008},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/166}
}
