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Paper 2008/109

Collisions for Round-Reduced LAKE

Florian Mendel and Martin Schläffer

Abstract

LAKE is a family of cryptographic hash functions presented at FSE 2008. It is an iterated hash function and defines two main instances with a 256 bit and 512 bit hash value. In this paper, we present the first security analysis of LAKE. We show how collision attacks, exploiting the non-bijectiveness of the internal compression function of LAKE, can be mounted on reduced variants of LAKE. We show an efficient attack on the 256 bit hash function LAKE-256 reduced to 3 rounds and present an actual colliding message pair. Furthermore, we present a theoretical attack on LAKE-256 reduced to 4 rounds with a complexity of $2^{109}$. By using more sophisticated message modification techniques we expect that the attack can be extended to 5 rounds. However, for the moment our approach does not appear to be applicable to the full LAKE-256 hash function (with all 8 rounds).

Note: Publication Info added.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. The final version of this paper has been published at ACISP 2008.
Keywords
cryptanalysishash functionscollision attack
Contact author(s)
martin schlaeffer @ iaik tugraz at
History
2008-08-14: revised
2008-03-12: received
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Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/109
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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