eprint.iacr.org will be offline for approximately an hour for routine maintenance at 11pm UTC on Tuesday, April 16. We lost some data between April 12 and April 14, and some authors have been notified that they need to resubmit their papers.
You are looking at a specific version 20080227:044428 of this paper. See the latest version.

Paper 2008/080

Pairing-Based Onion Routing with Improved Forward Secrecy

Aniket Kate and Greg Zaverucha and Ian Goldberg

Abstract

This paper presents new protocols for onion routing anonymity networks. We define a provably secure privacy-preserving key agreement scheme in an identity-based infrastructure setting, and use it to forge new onion routing circuit constructions. These constructions, based on a user's selection, offer immediate or eventual forward secrecy at each node in a circuit and require significantly less computation and communication than the telescoping mechanism used by Tor. Further, the use of the identity-based infrastructure also leads to a reduction in the required amount of authenticated directory information. Therefore, our constructions provide practical ways to allow onion routing anonymity networks to scale gracefully.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Extended version of a paper published in PETS 2007
Keywords
Onion routingTorpairing-based cryptographyanonymous key agreementforward secrecy
Contact author(s)
iang @ cs uwaterloo ca
History
2008-02-27: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/080
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.