Paper 2008/080
Pairing-Based Onion Routing with Improved Forward Secrecy
Aniket Kate, Greg Zaverucha, and Ian Goldberg
Abstract
This paper presents new protocols for onion routing anonymity networks. We define a provably secure privacy-preserving key agreement scheme in an identity-based infrastructure setting, and use it to forge new onion routing circuit constructions. These constructions, based on a user's selection, offer immediate or eventual forward secrecy at each node in a circuit and require significantly less computation and communication than the telescoping mechanism used by Tor. Further, the use of the identity-based infrastructure also leads to a reduction in the required amount of authenticated directory information. Therefore, our constructions provide practical ways to allow onion routing anonymity networks to scale gracefully.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Extended version of a paper published in PETS 2007
- Keywords
- Onion routingTorpairing-based cryptographyanonymous key agreementforward secrecy
- Contact author(s)
- iang @ cs uwaterloo ca
- History
- 2008-02-27: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/080
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/080, author = {Aniket Kate and Greg Zaverucha and Ian Goldberg}, title = {Pairing-Based Onion Routing with Improved Forward Secrecy}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/080}, year = {2008}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/080} }