Paper 2008/059
Buying random votes is as hard as buying no-votes
Stefan Popoveniuc and Jonathan Stanton
Abstract
In voting systems where a mark in a fixed position may mean a vote for Alice on a ballot,and a vote for Bob on another ballot, an attacker may coerce voters to put their mark at a certain position, enforcing effectively a random vote. This attack is meaningful if the voting system allows to take receipts with them and/or posts them to a bulletin board. The coercer may also ask for a blank receipt. We analyze this kind of attack and prove that it requires the same effort as a comparable attack would require against any voting system, even one without receipts.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. the paper has not been published anywhere
- Keywords
- votingrandomizartion attack
- Contact author(s)
- poste @ gwu edu
- History
- 2008-02-03: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/059
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/059,
author = {Stefan Popoveniuc and Jonathan Stanton},
title = {Buying random votes is as hard as buying no-votes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/059},
year = {2008},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/059}
}
