Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/007
Efficient One-round Key Exchange in the Standard Model
Colin Boyd and Yvonne Cliff and Juan M. Gonzalez Nieto and Kenneth G. Paterson
Abstract: We consider one-round identity-based key exchange protocols secure
in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and
Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how
KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different
protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed
analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when
instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are
competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the random
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / key establishment, key encapsulation, id-based cryptography, standard model
Publication Info: This is the full version of the paper appearing at ACISP 2008
Date: received 3 Jan 2008, last revised 7 May 2008
Contact author: j gonzaleznieto at qut edu au
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: - Fixed definition of session id in Protocol 2 and added some informal discussion on why malleability attacks do not work against protocol 2 in Section 4.
- Modified the second part of the proof of Protocol 2 to take into consideration the security of the randomness extractor and expander.
- Numerous typos have been corrected.
Version: 20080507:122121 (All versions of this report)
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