Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/006
Joint State Theorems for Public-Key Encryption and Digital Signature Functionalities with Local Computation
Ralf Kuesters and Max Tuengerthal
Abstract: In frameworks for universal composability, complex protocols can be
built from sub-protocols in a modular way using composition
theorems. However, as first pointed out and studied by Canetti and
Rabin, this modular approach often leads to impractical
implementations. For example, when using a functionality for digital
signatures within a more complex protocol, parties have to generate
new verification and signing keys for every session of the
protocol. This motivates to generalize composition theorems to
so-called joint state (composition) theorems, where different copies of a functionality may share some state, e.g., the same verification and signing keys.
In this paper, we present a joint state theorem which is
more general than the original theorem of Canetti and Rabin, for which
several problems and limitations are pointed out. We apply our theorem
to obtain joint state realizations for three functionalities:
public-key encryption, replayable public-key encryption, and digital
signatures. Unlike most other formulations, our functionalities model
that ciphertexts and signatures are computed locally, rather than
being provided by the adversary. To obtain the joint state
realizations, the functionalities have to be designed carefully.
Other formulations proposed in the literature are shown to be
unsuitable. Our work is based on the IITM model. Our definitions and
results demonstrate the expressivity and simplicity of this model. For
example, unlike Canetti's UC model, in the IITM model no explicit
joint state operator needs to be defined and the joint state theorem
follows immediately from the composition theorem in the IITM model.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / simulation-based security, joint state theorem
Original Publication (with major differences): Version from 2008 has been published in CSF 2008.
Date: received 3 Jan 2008, last revised 30 Aug 2013
Contact author: kuesters at uni-trier de
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: The major difference to the version from 2008 is that we now use the new IITM model: http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/025/
Version: 20130830:074929 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2008/006
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