Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/006
Joint State Theorems for Public-Key Encryption and Digital Signature Functionalities with Local Computation
Ralf Kuesters and Max Tuengerthal
Abstract: Composition theorems in simulation-based
approaches allow to build complex protocols from
sub-protocols in a modular way. However, as first pointed
out and studied by Canetti and Rabin, this modular
approach often leads to impractical implementations. For
example, when using a functionality for digital
signatures within a more complex protocol, parties have
to generate new verification and signing keys for every
session of the protocol. This motivates to generalize
composition theorems to so-called joint state theorems,
where different copies of a functionality may share some
state, e.g., the same verification and signing keys.
In this paper, we present a joint state theorem which is
more general than the original theorem of Canetti and
Rabin, for which several problems and limitations are
pointed out. We apply our theorem to obtain joint state
realizations for three functionalities: public-key
encryption, replayable public-key encryption, and digital
signatures. Unlike most other formulations, our
functionalities model that ciphertexts and signatures are
computed locally, rather than being provided by the
adversary. To obtain the joint state realizations, the
functionalities have to be designed carefully. Other
formulations are shown to be unsuitable. Our work is
based on a recently proposed, rigorous model for
simulation-based security by K{\"u}sters, called the IITM
model. Our definitions and results demonstrate the
expressivity and simplicity of this model. For example,
unlike Canetti's UC model, in the IITM model no explicit
joint state operator needs to be defined and the joint
state theorem follows immediately from the composition
theorem in the IITM model.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / simulation-based security, joint state theorem
Publication Info: Extended abstract to appear in CSF 2008
Date: received 3 Jan 2008, last revised 11 Apr 2008
Contact author: kuesters at uni-trier de
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Version: 20080411:165934 (All versions of this report)
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