Paper 2007/480

Differential Fault Analysis on the AES Key Schedule

Junko Takahashi and Toshinori Fukunaga

Abstract

This letter proposes a differential fault analysis on the AES key schedule and shows how an entire 128-bit AES key can be retrieved. In the workshop at FDTC 2007, we presented the DFA mechanism on the AES key schedule and proposed general attack rules. Using our proposed rules, we showed an efficient attack that can retrieve 80 bits of the 128-bit key. Recently, we have found a new attack that can obtain an additional 8 bits compared with our previous attack. As a result, we present most efficient attack for retrieving 88 bits of the 128-bit key using approximately two pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
DFAAESSide Channel Analysis
Contact author(s)
takahashi junko @ lab ntt co jp
History
2007-12-28: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2007/480
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/480,
      author = {Junko Takahashi and Toshinori Fukunaga},
      title = {Differential Fault Analysis on the {AES} Key Schedule},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/480},
      year = {2007},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/480}
}
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