Algebraic Side-Channel Collision Attacks on AES

Andrey Bogdanov; Andrey Pyshkin

Paper 2007/477

Algebraic Side-Channel Collision Attacks on AES

Andrey Bogdanov and Andrey Pyshkin

Abstract

This paper presents a new powerful side-channel cryptanalytic method - algebraic collision attacks - representing an efficient class of power analysis being based on both the power consumption information leakage and specific structure of the attacked cryptographic algorithm. This can result in an extremely low measurement count needed for a key recovery. The algebraic collision attacks are well applicable to AES, if one-byte collisions are detectable. For the recovery of the complete AES key, one needs 3 measurements with a probability of 0.42 and 4.24 PC hours post-processing, 4 measurements with a probability of 0.82 and several seconds of offline computations or 5 measurements with success probability close to 1 and several seconds of post-processing.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: AES collision attacks side-channel attacks generalized collisions Groebner bases algebraic attacks F4 algorithm
Contact author(s): abogdanov @ crypto ruhr-uni-bochum de
History: 2007-12-28: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2007/477
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/477,
      author = {Andrey Bogdanov and Andrey Pyshkin},
      title = {Algebraic Side-Channel Collision Attacks on {AES}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/477},
      year = {2007},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/477}
}