Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2007/464
Secure Computation Without Authentication
Boaz Barak and Ran Canetti and Yehuda Lindell and Rafael Pass and Tal Rabin
Abstract: Research on secure multiparty computation has mainly concentrated on
the case where the parties can authenticate each other and the
communication between them. This work addresses the question of what
security can be guaranteed when authentication is not available. We
consider a completely unauthenticated setting, where {\em all}
messages sent by the parties may be tampered with and modified by
the adversary without the uncorrupted parties being able to detect
this fact. In this model, it is not possible to achieve the same
level of security as in the authenticated-channel setting.
Nevertheless, we show that meaningful security guarantees {\em
can} be provided: Essentially, all the adversary can do is to
partition the network into disjoint sets, where in each set the
computation is secure in of itself, and also {\em independent} of
the computation in the other sets. In this setting we provide, for
the first time, non-trivial security guarantees in a model with {\em
no setup assumptions whatsoever.} We also obtain similar results
while guaranteeing universal composability, in some variants of the
common reference string model. Finally, our protocols can be used to
provide conceptually simple and unified solutions to a number of
problems that were studied separately in the past, including
password-based authenticated key exchange and non-malleable
commitments. As an application of our results, we study the
question of constructing secure protocols in partially-authenticated
networks, where some of the links are authenticated and some are not
(as is the case in most networks today).
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / secure computation, authentication, secure composition, password-based authentication
Publication Info: Preliminary version at Crypto 2005. Full version to appear at Journal of Cryptology.
Date: received 16 Dec 2007, last revised 20 Aug 2010
Contact author: canetti at csail mit edu
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20100820:181600 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2007/464
Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion
[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]