Paper 2007/438

Ordered Multisignatures and Identity-Based Sequential Aggregate Signatures, with Applications to Secure Routing

Alexandra Boldyreva, Craig Gentry, Adam O'Neill, and Dae Hyun Yum

Abstract

We construct two new multiparty digital signature schemes that allow multiple signers to sequentially produce a compact, fixed-length signature. First, we introduce a new primitive that we call \emph{ordered multisignatures} (OMS), which allows signers to attest to a common message as well as the order in which they signed. Our OMS construction substantially improves computational efficiency and scalability over any existing scheme with suitable functionality. Second, we design a new identity-based sequential aggregate signature scheme, where signers can attest to different messages and signature verification does not require knowledge of traditional public keys. The latter property permits savings on bandwidth and storage as compared to public-key solutions. In contrast to the only prior scheme to provide this functionality, ours offers improved security that does not rely on synchronized clocks or a trusted first signer. We provide formal security definitions and support the proposed schemes with security proofs under appropriate computational assumptions. We focus on potential applications of our schemes to secure network routing, but we believe they will find many other applications as well.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Preliminary version appears in ACM CCS 2007
Keywords
Multisignaturesaggregate signaturespairings
Contact author(s)
amoneill @ cc gatech edu
History
2010-02-21: last of 4 revisions
2007-12-05: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2007/438
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/438,
      author = {Alexandra Boldyreva and Craig Gentry and Adam O'Neill and Dae Hyun Yum},
      title = {Ordered Multisignatures and Identity-Based Sequential Aggregate Signatures, with Applications to Secure Routing},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/438},
      year = {2007},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/438}
}
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