Paper 2007/415
Cryptanalytic Flaws in Oh et al.'s ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol
Meng-Hui Lim, Sanggon Lee, and Hoonjae Lee
Abstract
A key agreement protocol is designed for two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret key, which is used to preserve confidentiality and data integrity over an open network. In 2007, Oh et al. proposed an efficient ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol on elliptic curve pairings, which is believed to be able to generate two session keys securely after a protocol execution. However, we discover that their protocol is in fact susceptible to the basic impersonation attack as well as the key compromise impersonation attack. In this paper, we present the imperfections of Oh et al.'s scheme and subsequently we suggest a slight modification to the scheme which would resolve the problems.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- CryptanalysisImpersonation AttackKey Agreement Protocol
- Contact author(s)
- meng17121983 @ yahoo com
- History
- 2007-11-06: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/415
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/415,
author = {Meng-Hui Lim and Sanggon Lee and Hoonjae Lee},
title = {Cryptanalytic Flaws in Oh et al.'s {ID}-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/415},
year = {2007},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/415}
}
