Although we obtain a weak version of Rabin OT (where the malicious receiver may decrease his erasure probability), it can nevertheless be reduced to secure 1-out-of-2 OT.
Elaborating on the first protocol, we provide a practical construction for 1-out-of-2 OT.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Oblivious transfer, coding-based cryptography, McEliece cryptosystem, permuted kernel problem. Date: received 26 Sep 2007, last revised 30 Jun 2008 Contact author: overbeck at cdc informatik tu-darmstadt de, kirill morozov@aist go jp Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20080630:081138 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2007/382 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion