Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2007/364
A Proof of Security of a Mesh Security Architecture
Doug Kuhlman and Ryan Moriarty and Tony Braskich and Steve Emeott and Mahesh Tripunitara
Abstract: The IEEE 802.11s standard is tasked to provide ways of establishing and securing a wireless mesh network. One proposal establishes a Mesh Security Architecture (MSA), with an interesting key hierarchy and full protocol definitions. This paper proves the correctness and security of the MSA proposal and its corresponding protocols. We also propose and prove the security of an additional protocol (an abbreviated handshake) which offers a substantial efficiency improvement in certain instances. To prove the entire architecture secure, we utilize Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) to prove each protocol secure. From that basis, we can show the protocols compose securely to prove the entire architecture. We also contribute some novel concepts to PCL, to allow us to prove the security of the overall architecture.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / IEEE 802.11s, protocol proving, mesh security architecture, protocol composition logic (PCL)
Date: received 12 Sep 2007
Contact author: doug kuhlman at motorola com
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Expediting publication would be valuable for standards work.
Version: 20070913:200844 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2007/364
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