Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2007/356
A Block Cipher based PRNG Secure Against Side-Channel Key Recovery
Christophe Petit and Francois-Xavier Standaert and Olivier Pereira and Tal G. Malkin and Moti Yung
Abstract: We study the security of a block cipher-based pseudorandom number generator, both in the black box world and in the physical world, separately. We first show that the construction is a secure PRNG in the ideal cipher model. Then, we demonstrate its security against a Bayesian side-channel key recovery adversary. As a main result, we show that our construction guarantees that the success rate of the adversary does not increase with the number of physical observations, but in a limited and controlled way. Besides, we observe that, under common assumptions on side-channel attack strategies, increasing the security parameter (typically the block cipher key size) by a polynomial factor involves an increase of a side-channel attack complexity by an exponential factor, making the probability of a successful attack negligible. We believe this work provides a first interesting example of the way the algorithmic design of a cryptographic scheme influences its side-channel resistance.
Category / Keywords: implementations / physically observable cryptography, side-channel attacks, provable security, block ciphers
Publication Info: To appear in the proceedings of ASIACCS 2008.
Date: received 8 Sep 2007, last revised 2 Jan 2008
Contact author: fstandae at uclouvain be
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: More details are available on: http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/~fstandae/tsca/
Version: 20080102:180221 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2007/356
Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion
[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]