Paper 2007/356
A Block Cipher based PRNG Secure Against Side-Channel Key Recovery
Christophe Petit, Francois-Xavier Standaert, Olivier Pereira, Tal G. Malkin, and Moti Yung
Abstract
We study the security of a block cipher-based pseudorandom number generator, both in the black box world and in the physical world, separately. We first show that the construction is a secure PRNG in the ideal cipher model. Then, we demonstrate its security against a Bayesian side-channel key recovery adversary. As a main result, we show that our construction guarantees that the success rate of the adversary does not increase with the number of physical observations, but in a limited and controlled way. Besides, we observe that, under common assumptions on side-channel attack strategies, increasing the security parameter (typically the block cipher key size) by a polynomial factor involves an increase of a side-channel attack complexity by an exponential factor, making the probability of a successful attack negligible. We believe this work provides a first interesting example of the way the algorithmic design of a cryptographic scheme influences its side-channel resistance.
Note: More details are available on: http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/~fstandae/tsca/
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. To appear in the proceedings of ASIACCS 2008.
- Keywords
- physically observable cryptographyside-channel attacksprovable securityblock ciphers
- Contact author(s)
- fstandae @ uclouvain be
- History
- 2008-01-02: revised
- 2007-09-13: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/356
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/356,
author = {Christophe Petit and Francois-Xavier Standaert and Olivier Pereira and Tal G. Malkin and Moti Yung},
title = {A Block Cipher based {PRNG} Secure Against Side-Channel Key Recovery},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/356},
year = {2007},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/356}
}
