This work considers a model for (unconditional) secure multiparty computation for networks of low degrees in which authenticated channels are available between very few pairs of parties. Not all honest parties can achieve traditional security guarantees of multiparty computation for this setting. This formulation of secure multiparty computation, which permits some of the honest parties to be "sacrificed" is called almost everywhere secure computation. In this work we show how to realize a.e.s.c., on a few special families of incomplete networks, for the case of Byzantine corruptions.
Category / Keywords: simulation paradigm, secure multi-party computation Publication Info: No Date: received 4 Sep 2007, last revised 1 Mar 2009, withdrawn 23 Jun 2009 Contact author: shailesh vaya at gmail com, vaya@cse iitm ernet in Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --) Note: (1) Simplified proof of security with easier to understand structure. (2) More elaborate explaination of the definition of security and how input indistinguishablity type definition is implied by it. (3) Elaborate comparison.
Version: 20090623:104035 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2007/346 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion