Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2007/342
A New Security Model for Cross-Realm C2C-PAKE Protocol
Fengjiao Wang and Yuqing Zhang
Abstract: Cross realm client-to-client password authenticated key exchange (C2C-PAKE) schemes are designed to enable two clients in different realms to agree on a common session key using different passwords. In 2006, Yin-Bao presented the first provably secure cross-realm C2C-PAKE, which security is proven rigorously within a formally defined security model and based on the hardness of some computationally intractable assumptions. However, soon after, Phan et al. pointed out that the Yin-Bao scheme was flawed. In this paper, we first analyze the necessary security attributes in the cross-realm C2C-PAKE scenario, and then a new security model for cross-realm C2C-PAKE is given. Analogous to the general construction of 3PAKE protocol for single server C2C-PAKE setting, we give a general construction of cross-realm C2C-PAKE protocol, which security is proved in the new security model.
Category / Keywords: Password-authenticated key exchange, cross realm, client-to-client, provably secure, security model.
Date: received 29 Aug 2007, last revised 30 Aug 2007
Contact author: wangfj at nipc org cn
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Version: 20070905:063256 (All versions of this report)
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