Paper 2007/320

On the Big Gap Between |p| and |q| in DSA

Zhengjun Cao

Abstract

We introduce a message attack against DSA and show that the security of DSA is indeed reduced to the following problem, i.e., find θZq such that\ \centerline{z=(g^θmodp)modq}\ where Ordp(g^)=q and zZq is randomly chosen by the adversary. Compared with the common key-only attack, i.e., find xZq such that\ \centerline{} the message attack is more effective because of the big gap between (1024-bit) and (160-bit).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
DSASchnorr's signaturemessage attack
Contact author(s)
caozhj @ shu edu cn
History
2007-08-16: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2007/320
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/320,
      author = {Zhengjun Cao},
      title = {On the Big Gap   Between $|p|$ and $|q|$ in {DSA}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/320},
      year = {2007},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/320}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.