Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2007/262

Certificateless Public Key Encryption Secure against Malicious KGC Attacks in the Standard Model

Yong Ho Hwang and Joseph K. Liu and Sherman S.M. Chow

Abstract: Recently, Au et al. pointed out a seemingly neglected security concern for certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) scheme, where a malicious key generation center (KGC) can compromise the confidentiality of the messages by embedding extra trapdoors in the system parameter. Although some schemes are secure against such an attack, they require random oracles to prove the security. In this paper, we first show that two existing CL-PKE schemes without random oracles are not secure against malicious KGC, we then propose the first CL-PKE scheme secure against malicious KGC attack, with proof in the standard model.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / certificateless encryption, pairing, standard model, malicious KGC

Publication Info: Journal of Universal Computer Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, pp. 463-480

Date: received 4 Jul 2007, last revised 12 Mar 2008

Contact author: ksliu9 at gmail com

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20080312:172134 (All versions of this report)

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