Paper 2007/262
Certificateless Public Key Encryption Secure against Malicious KGC Attacks in the Standard Model
Yong Ho Hwang, Joseph K. Liu, and Sherman S. M. Chow
Abstract
Recently, Au et al. pointed out a seemingly neglected security concern for certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) scheme, where a malicious key generation center (KGC) can compromise the confidentiality of the messages by embedding extra trapdoors in the system parameter. Although some schemes are secure against such an attack, they require random oracles to prove the security. In this paper, we first show that two existing CL-PKE schemes without random oracles are not secure against malicious KGC, we then propose the first CL-PKE scheme secure against malicious KGC attack, with proof in the standard model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Journal of Universal Computer Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, pp. 463-480
- Keywords
- certificateless encryptionpairingstandard modelmalicious KGC
- Contact author(s)
- ksliu9 @ gmail com
- History
- 2008-03-12: last of 3 revisions
- 2007-07-09: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/262
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/262,
author = {Yong Ho Hwang and Joseph K. Liu and Sherman S. M. Chow},
title = {Certificateless Public Key Encryption Secure against Malicious {KGC} Attacks in the Standard Model},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/262},
year = {2007},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/262}
}
