Paper 2007/244
A Note on the Relay Attacks on e-passports: The Case of Czech e-passports
Martin Hlavac and Tomas Rosa
Abstract
The threat of relay attacks on authentication protocols is often well recognized, especially for contactless applications like RFID chips. It is, therefore, a bit surprising to meet an implementation that actually encourages rather than eliminates these attacks. We present our experimental observations concerning Czech e-passports. These show clearly an inherent weakness rooted in lower layers of ISO 14443. As the behavior is unavoidable, it induces a question on whether the e-passport should not have used a different communication protocol or authentication scheme.
Note: The revision fixes several typos (FWT vs. FTW, $36 \mu s$ vs. $36 ms$, invalid reference to conclusion), adds explanation of ATQB and changes "RF channel 2" to "channel 2" in the figure.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- RFIDe-passportrelay attack
- Contact author(s)
- hlavm1am @ artax karlin mff cuni cz
- History
- 2007-06-24: revised
- 2007-06-19: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/244
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/244,
author = {Martin Hlavac and Tomas Rosa},
title = {A Note on the Relay Attacks on e-passports: The Case of Czech e-passports},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/244},
year = {2007},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/244}
}
