Paper 2007/237
Forward-secure Key Evolution in Wireless Sensor Networks
Marek Klonowski and Miros\l{}aw Kuty\l{}owski and Micha\l{} Ren and Katarzyna Rybarczyk
Abstract
We consider a key distribution scheme for securing node-to-node communication in sensor networks. While most schemes in use are based on random predistribution, we consider a system of dynamic pairwise keys based on design due to Ren, Tanmoy and Zhou. We design and analyze a variation of this scheme, in which capturing a node does not lead to security threats for the past communication. Instead of bit-flipping, we use a cryptographic one-way function. While this immediately guarantees forward-security, it is not clear whether the pseudorandom transformation of the keys does not lead to subtle security risks due to a specific distribution of reachable keys, such as existence of small attractor subspaces. (This problem does not occur for the design of Ren, Tanmoy and Zhou.) We show, in a rigid mathematical way, that this is not the case: after a small number of steps probability distribution of keys leaves no room for potential attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- communication in sensor networkskey managementkey distributionforward securitydirected random graphs
- Contact author(s)
- renmich @ amu edu pl
- History
- 2007-06-19: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/237
- License
-
CC BY