Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2007/237

Forward-secure Key Evolution in Wireless Sensor Networks

Marek Klonowski and Miros\l{}aw Kuty\l{}owski and Micha\l{} Ren and Katarzyna Rybarczyk

Abstract: We consider a key distribution scheme for securing node-to-node communication in sensor networks. While most schemes in use are based on random predistribution, we consider a system of dynamic pairwise keys based on design due to Ren, Tanmoy and Zhou. We design and analyze a variation of this scheme, in which capturing a node does not lead to security threats for the past communication. Instead of bit-flipping, we use a cryptographic one-way function. While this immediately guarantees forward-security, it is not clear whether the pseudorandom transformation of the keys does not lead to subtle security risks due to a specific distribution of reachable keys, such as existence of small attractor subspaces. (This problem does not occur for the design of Ren, Tanmoy and Zhou.) We show, in a rigid mathematical way, that this is not the case: after a small number of steps probability distribution of keys leaves no room for potential attacks.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / communication in sensor networks, key management, key distribution, forward security, directed random graphs

Date: received 15 Jun 2007

Contact author: renmich at amu edu pl

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Version: 20070619:195636 (All versions of this report)

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