Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2007/222
Towards Security Limits in Side-Channel Attacks
Francois-Xavier Standaert and Eric Peeters and Cedric Archambeau and Jean-Jacques Quisquater
Abstract: This paper considers a recently introduced framework for the analysis of physically observable cryptographic devices. It exploits
a model of computation that allows quantifying the effect of practically relevant leakage functions with a combination of security and information theoretic metrics. As a result of these metrics, a unified evaluation methodology for side-channel attacks was derived that we illustrate by applying it to an exemplary block cipher implementation. We first consider a Hamming weight leakage function and evaluate the efficiency of two commonly investigated countermeasures, namely noise addition and masking. Then, we show that the proposed methodology allows capturing certain non-trivial intuitions about the respective effectiveness of these countermeasures Finally, we justify the need of combined metrics for the evaluation, comparison and understanding of side-channel attacks.
Category / Keywords: implementations, side-channel attacks, block ciphers
Publication Info: The paper was published in the proceedings of CHES 2006. This ePrint version contains corrected notations in order to comply with the updated notations of the model in: http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/139.
Date: received 8 Jun 2007, last revised 8 Feb 2008
Contact author: fstandae at uclouvain be
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: More details are available on: http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/~fstandae/tsca/
Version: 20080208:111843 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2007/222
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