Paper 2007/222
Towards Security Limits in Side-Channel Attacks
Francois-Xavier Standaert, Eric Peeters, Cedric Archambeau, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater
Abstract
This paper considers a recently introduced framework for the analysis of physically observable cryptographic devices. It exploits a model of computation that allows quantifying the effect of practically relevant leakage functions with a combination of security and information theoretic metrics. As a result of these metrics, a unified evaluation methodology for side-channel attacks was derived that we illustrate by applying it to an exemplary block cipher implementation. We first consider a Hamming weight leakage function and evaluate the efficiency of two commonly investigated countermeasures, namely noise addition and masking. Then, we show that the proposed methodology allows capturing certain non-trivial intuitions about the respective effectiveness of these countermeasures Finally, we justify the need of combined metrics for the evaluation, comparison and understanding of side-channel attacks.
Note: More details are available on: http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/~fstandae/tsca/
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. The paper was published in the proceedings of CHES 2006. This ePrint version contains corrected notations in order to comply with the updated notations of the model in: http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/139.
- Keywords
- implementationsside-channel attacksblock ciphers
- Contact author(s)
- fstandae @ uclouvain be
- History
- 2008-02-08: last of 3 revisions
- 2007-06-08: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/222
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/222,
author = {Francois-Xavier Standaert and Eric Peeters and Cedric Archambeau and Jean-Jacques Quisquater},
title = {Towards Security Limits in Side-Channel Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/222},
year = {2007},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/222}
}
