Paper 2007/199
A Framework for Game-Based Security Proofs
David Nowak
Abstract
Information security is nowadays an important issue. Its essential ingredient is cryptography. A common way to present security proofs is to structure them as sequences of games. The main contribution of this paper is a framework which refines this approach. We make explicit important theorems used implicitly by cryptographers but never explicitly stated. Our aim is to have a framework in which proofs are precise enough to be mechanically checked, and readable enough to be humanly checked. We illustrate the use of our framework by proving in a systematic way the so-called semantic security of the encryption scheme ElGamal and its hashed version. All proofs have been mechanically checked in the proof assistant Coq.
Note: The source code is available at: http://staff.aist.go.jp/david.nowak/ICICS2007/ 28 May 2007: first public version 22 Jun 2007: added application to the hashed version of the encryption scheme ElGamal 1 Oct 2007: short version accepted at ICICS 2007: http://www.icics2007.org.cn/ 7 Nov 2007: added more explanations following comments by anonymous reviewers
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. A short version of this paper will appear in the proceedings of ICICS 2007
- Keywords
- sequence of gamesproof assistantformal verificationmonadprobability
- Contact author(s)
- david nowak @ aist go jp
- History
- 2007-11-07: last of 3 revisions
- 2007-05-31: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/199
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/199,
author = {David Nowak},
title = {A Framework for Game-Based Security Proofs},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2007/199},
year = {2007},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/199}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/199}
}
