Paper 2007/165
Inductive Proof Method for Computational Secrecy
Arnab Roy, Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, and John C. Mitchell
Abstract
We investigate inductive methods for proving secrecy properties of network protocols, in a ``computational" setting applying a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary. As in cryptographic studies, our secrecy properties assert that no probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher can win a suitable game presented by a challenger. Our method for establishing secrecy properties uses inductive proofs of computational trace-based properties, and axioms and inference rules for relating trace-based properties to non-trace-based properties. We illustrate the method, which is formalized in a logical setting that does not require explicit reasoning about computational complexity, probability, or the possible actions of the attacker, by giving a modular proof of computational authentication and secrecy properties of the Kerberos V5 protocol.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Contact author(s)
- arnab @ stanford edu
- History
- 2007-05-07: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/165
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/165, author = {Arnab Roy and Anupam Datta and Ante Derek and John C. Mitchell}, title = {Inductive Proof Method for Computational Secrecy}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/165}, year = {2007}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/165} }