To demonstrate the power of the new primitive, we apply it to solve a problem of current onion-routing systems focusing on the Tor system in particular. Posting through Tor is currently blocked by sites such as Wikipedia due to the real concern that anonymous channels can be used to vandalize online content. By injecting a Hidden-IBS inside the header of an HTTP POST request and requiring the exit-policy of Tor to forward only properly signed POST requests, we demonstrate how sites like Wikipedia may allow anonymous posting while being ensured that the recovery of (say) the IP address of a vandal would be still possible through a dispute resolution system. Using our new Hidden-IBS primitive in this scenario allows to keep the listing of identities (e.g., IP addresses) of Tor users computationally hidden while maintaining an independent Opening Authority which would not have been possible with previous approaches.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Publication Info: Extended version for a Financial Cryptography 2007 paper Date: received 19 Apr 2007, last revised 24 Apr 2007 Contact author: hszhou at cse uconn edu Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Note: Presented at FC'07 by Aggelos Kiayias; Slides are available at http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~akiayias/talks/ Version: 20070424:144344 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2007/140 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion