This paper proposes a new authenticated key agreement protocol, called CMQV (`Combined' MQV), which incorporates design principles from MQV, HMQV and NAXOS. The new protocol achieves the efficiency of HMQV and admits a natural one-pass variant. Moreover, we present a simple and intuitive proof that CMQV is secure in the LaMacchia-Lauter-Mityagin model.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / key agreement protocols, provable security, MQV, Diffie-Hellman Publication Info: Journal of "Designs Codes and Cryptography", 2008, v46(3). Date: received 28 Mar 2007, last revised 21 Jun 2009 Contact author: bustaoglu at cryptolounge net Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Note: Updated (extended) and corrected version; see "Errata" and "Revisions" in the appendix for a summary of changes. Version: 20090622:045633 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2007/123 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion