In this paper, we initiate the systematic study of semantic integrity in NVEs from a security point of view. We argue that naive policies to enforce semantic integrity involve intolerable network load, and are therefore not practically feasible. We present a new provably secure semantic integrity protocol based on cryptographic primitives which enables the server system to audit the local computations of the clients on demand. Our approach facilitates low network and CPU load, incurs reasonable engineering overhead, and maximally decouples the auditing process from the soft real time constraints of the simulation.
Category / Keywords: applications / protocols, audit trails Publication Info: An extended abstract of this paper appears at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2007 Date: received 16 Feb 2007 Contact author: skatzenbeisser at acm org Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | BibTeX Citation Version: 20070220:101537 (All versions of this report) Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion