

# Forward-secure RFID Authentication and Key Exchange

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**Abstract.** Security and privacy in RFID systems is an important and active research area. A number of challenges arise due to the extremely limited computational, storage and communication abilities of a typical RFID tag. This work describes two families of simple, inexpensive, and untraceable identification protocols for RFID tags. The proposed protocols involve minimal interaction between a tag and a reader and place low computational burden on the tag, requiring only a pseudo-random generator. They also impose low computational load on the back-end server. The paper also describes a universally composable security model tuned for RFID applications. By making specific setup, communication, and concurrency assumptions that are realistic in the RFID application setting, we arrive at a model that guarantees strong security and availability properties, while still permitting the design of practical RFID protocols. We show that our protocols are provably secure within the new security model. The security supports, availability, authentication, forward-secure anonymity and key exchange, and modularity. The last attribute is most appropriate for ubiquitous applications.

**Keywords.** RFID, Availability, Authentication, Forward-secure Anonymity, Universal Composability.

## 1 Introduction

While admittedly a new technology, radio-frequency identification devices (RFID)s have great potential for business automation applications and as smart, mass-market, embedded devices. However, several security and privacy concerns have been identified in connection with the use of RFIDs. In this paper, we concentrate on the use of RFIDs as authentication devices. We start by elaborating on the significant characteristics that distinguish RFID authentication models from general-purpose authentication.

- *Lightweight.* RFID authentication protocols must be lightweight. Many RFID platforms can only implement highly optimized symmetric-key cryptographic techniques.
- *Anonymity.* General-purpose authentication protocols may or not have support for anonymity. On the other hand, many proposed RFID applications typically require anonymity fundamentally, for instance for devices embedded in human bodies or their clothes, documents, etc. So anonymity should be considered a core requirement of RFID authentication protocols.
- *Availability.* RFID authentication protocols are not only vulnerable to classical attacks on authentication—impersonation, man-in-the-middle, etc—but also to attacks that force the RFID device to assume a state from which it can no longer successfully authenticate itself. Such vulnerabilities are often exacerbated by the portable nature of RFID devices, allowing them to be manipulated at a distance by covert readers.
- *Forward-security.* RFID devices may be discarded, are easily captured, and may be highly vulnerable to side-channel attacks on the stored keys. Forward-security is important to guarantee the privacy of past transactions if the long-term key or current session key are compromised.
- *Concurrent Security.* Current RFID devices support only sequential execution. However, overall security system using RFIDs are nearly always highly concurrent.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, it is important to

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<sup>1</sup> Indeed, commercialization of RFID systems emphasize the ability of readers to simultaneously identify multiple devices (up to a few hundred/second) as an important economic factor that makes RFID deployment cost-effective when compared with systems that scan barcodes.

address security of the overall protocol (involving the RFIDs and other system entities) in concurrent environments, where it is assumed that adversary can adaptively modify communications.

Our goals are to design authentication protocols that will be used as sub-protocols in ubiquitous applications, or as standalone applications in combination with other applications. As such, we seek to develop protocols that can be analyzed only once and then applied universally. In order to achieve this, we adopt a specific approach to the formalization of protocol security known as the Universal Composability (UC) framework. Protocols shown to be UC-secure remain secure under concurrent and modular composition, and therefore are easily plugged into more complex protocols without requiring security reassessment with each new use.

### 1.1 Universally Composable Security

UC security is based on notions of interactive indistinguishability of real from ideal protocol executions. This approach requires the following components:

1. A mathematical model of real protocol executions. In this model, honest parties are represented by probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines (PPT) that correctly execute the protocol as specified, and adversarial parties that can deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary fashion. The adversarial parties are controlled by a single PPT adversary that (1) has full knowledge of the state of adversarial parties, (2) can arbitrarily schedule the communication channels and activation periods of all parties, both honest and adversarial, and (3) interacts with the environment in arbitrary ways, in particular can eavesdrop on all communications.
2. An idealized model of protocol executions, where the security properties do not depend on the correct use of cryptography, but instead on the behavior of an *ideal functionality*, a trusted party that all parties may invoke to guarantee correct execution of particular protocol steps. The ideal-world adversary is controlled by the ideal functionality, to reproduce as faithfully as possible the behavior of the real adversary.
3. A proof that no environment can distinguish (with better than negligible accuracy) real- from ideal-world protocol runs by observing the system behavior, including exchanged messages and outputs computed by the parties (honest and adversarial). The proof works by translating real-world protocol runs into the ideal world.

An important separation between theory and practice is efficiency. We design our protocols to minimize security overhead when the system is not under attack (optimistic behavior). Achieving this goal together with availability and forward-security in a lightweight manner suitable for RFIDs is a nontrivial task, as witnessed in the literature. (A review of prior work is provided in Section 2.)

*Our contributions.*

- A new UC authentication framework, that extends the model introduced in [9] to include anonymity and forward-security, in Section 4.
- New protocols that provide for optimistic, forward-anonymous authentication and that guarantee availability and minimize security overhead in the honest case, in Section 4.
- Lightweight implementation of the protocols in a wide-variety of RFID architectures by using only PRGs, in Section 6.
- Featherweight PRG-based protocols that achieve identical security guarantees with a simpler architecture under the assumption that the adversary has only time-limited opportunities to interact with tags (“fly-by” attacks), in Section 7.
- Security proofs for the protocol families, in Sections 5, 6, and 7.

<b>Functionality <math>\mathcal{F}_{\text{auth}}</math></b>
$\mathcal{F}_{\text{auth}}$ has session identifier $sid$ and only admits messages with the same $sid$ .
<b>Upon receiving input INITIATE from protocol party <math>p</math></b> : if party $p$ is corrupted then ignore this message. Else generate a unique subsession identification $s$ , record $\text{init}(s, p)$ and send $\text{init}(s, \text{type}(p), \text{active}(p))$ to the adversary.
<b>Upon receiving message ACCEPT(<math>s, s'</math>) from the adversary</b> : if there are two records $\text{init}(s, p)$ and $\text{init}(s', p')$ such that parties $p$ and $p'$ are feasible partners, then remove these records, record $\text{partner}(s', p', s, p)$ and write output $\text{ACCEPT}(p')$ to party $p$ . Else if there is a record $\text{partner}(s, p, s', p')$ then remove this record and write output $\text{ACCEPT}(p')$ to party $p$ .
<b>Upon receiving message IMPERSONATE(<math>s, p'</math>) from the adversary</b> : if there is a record $\text{init}(s, p)$ and party $p'$ is corrupted then remove this record and write output $\text{ACCEPT}(p')$ to $p$ .
<b>Upon receiving message CORRUPT(<math>s</math>) from the adversary</b> : if there is a record $\text{init}(s, p)$ or $\text{partner}(s, p, s', p')$ such that $p$ is corruptible then mark $p$ as corrupted and remove $\text{state}(p)$ .

**Fig. 1.** Ideal anonymous authentication

## 2 Previous work

The need for lightweight security mechanisms in RFID applications does not imply that one can afford to provide security under limited attack models, since attackers may have additional resources. For instance, Green et al. [8] have shown how realistic, simple attacks can compromise tags that use encryption with small keys—even though only brief interactions between attackers and the target tag ever take place—we shall call such limited-interaction attacks *fly-by attacks*. Proposed protocols, some very ingenious [26], and which moreover enjoy strong security properties under limited attack models [28] have been shown to be vulnerable to man-in-the-middle-attacks [19] that could be implemented as fly-by attacks. Other interesting protocols, such as YA-TRAP [37], use timestamps. While effective in reducing complexity, the use of timestamps leaves the tags vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks that can permanently invalidate the tags, as pointed out by G. Tsudik in [37].

The research literature in RFID security, including anonymous authentication protocols, is already quite extensive and growing—for reference, a fairly comprehensive repository is available online at [2]. Here, we shall refrain from a comprehensive review and focus consideration on those works most directly related to our construction. Ohkubo et al. [33] proposed a hash-based authentication protocol that bears close resemblance to our protocols. However, the scheme in [33] is vulnerable to certain re-play attacks. The proposed modifications in [3] address the replay-attack problem but does not consider the issue of *availability*, and their scheme is vulnerable to attacks where the attacker forces an honest tag to fall out of synchronization with the server so that it can no longer authenticate itself successfully. Dimitriou [18] also proposes an anonymous RFID protocol vulnerable to desynchronization attacks against availability.

Another hash-based authentication protocol is introduced by Henrici et al. [23]. Their solution does not provide full privacy guarantees, in particular, the tag is vulnerable to tracing when the attacker interrupts the authentication protocol mid-way. Molnar et al. [31] propose a hash-tree based authentication scheme for RFIDs. However, the amount of computation required per tag is not constant, but logarithmic with the number of tags in the hash-tree. Also, if a tag is lost, anonymity for the rest of the hash-tree group may be compromised. Finally, the scheme does not provide for forward-anonymity. A scheme by Juels [25] only provides security against “fly-by” attacks where the attacker is allowed to interact with the tag for a fixed time budget but does not provide protection in the case of tag capture.

There is comparatively little work on RFID protocols where security is provided in a unified model (for examples, see [1, 9]). Admittedly, in the RFID setting, one should be aggressive in making simplifications to security models that *are* justified, as in such a constrained environment some tradeoffs are needed in order to minimize the complexity and maximize the efficiency of the designed solution. One

such restriction that we adopt is to prohibit tags from parallel execution of authentication protocols (note that the prohibition does not extend to corrupt parties or non-tag entities). This restriction is readily relaxed when tags use multiple separate keys for concurrent executions.

In this paper we articulate security models for anonymous RFID authentication and key exchange protocols. These models extend the framework introduced in [9] in several ways. In particular, we support session-key compromise and replacement, extending the model in that paper to key-exchange protocols ([9] considers only authentication). Note that Juels and Weiss [27] propose an alternative anonymity definition following a traditional adversary-game approach (i.e., without consideration for composability issues).

The proposed model defines security in terms of indistinguishability between real and ideal protocol simulations, an approach first outlined by Beaver [7, 6, 5], and extended by Canetti as the universal composability framework [10–12]. A similar approach has also been pursued by Pfitzmann and Waidner [35, 36], under the name *reactive systems*. Several protocols have been proposed under the UC framework, including authentication and key-exchange [15, 24, 14], zero-knowledge proofs [13, 16], and other cryptographic primitives [29]. More recently, an RFID privacy-oriented protocol has been proven in the UC setting [1].

### 3 UC formalization

As noted in Section 1.1, the UC model requires both a model of real protocol executions (familiar from traditional Byzantine security models) as well as a model of ideal protocol executions. The real-world model of protocol executions simply has the honest parties execute the protocol, while adversarial parties are centrally controlled by an adversary. As in other Byzantine settings, all real-world parties, including the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , are probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines (PPTs). The real-world adversary can eavesdrop into and schedule all communication channels. It can moreover schedule the activation order of parties.

In both the real and ideal world simulations, the adversary interacts with a PPT,<sup>2</sup> the *environment*  $\mathcal{Z}$ . In the UC framework, the context of a protocol execution is captured by a *session identifier*  $sid$ . The  $sid$  is controlled by  $\mathcal{Z}$ , and reflects external aspects of execution, as for example, temporal and/or locational issues, shared attributes and/or keys, etc. All parties involved in a protocol execution instance share the same  $sid$ . In particular, the security proof cannot make any assumptions about extraneous knowledge that may or not be available to  $\mathcal{Z}$  through interactions with other entities (including other instances of the protocol). The environment  $\mathcal{Z}$  is the first party to become active in any simulation, and it activates the adversary next. If the adversary (and all other parties) become inactive, control passes to the environment. The adversary and  $\mathcal{Z}$  may interact in arbitrary ways, and the real-world simulation halts when the environment halts.

The ideal world, however, departs considerably from the real world, in that honest parties are controlled by an ideal functionality. We now describe the ideal functionalities corresponding to *forward-secure anonymous authentication* and *forward-secure anonymous key exchange*, respectively. We also describe an extra functionality, that we call *anonymous wireless communication*. This last functionality captures an (implicit) assumption in all protocols for anonymous RFID authentication, namely that the RFID communication layers provide for anonymous communication channels. In the following, each of these functionalities is described in detail.

Observe that the ideal functionality security is unconditional, and does not rely on any cryptographically primitives that are computationally secure. This is because, in the UC framework, the security supports concurrent executions.

<b>Functionality <math>\mathcal{F}_{\text{aake}}</math></b>
$\mathcal{F}_{\text{aake}}$ has session identifier $sid$ and only admits messages with the same $sid$ .
<b>Upon receiving input INITIATE from protocol party <math>p</math></b> : if party $p$ is corrupted then ignore this message. Else generate a unique subsession identification $s$ , record $\text{init}(s, p)$ and send $\text{init}(s, \text{type}(p), \text{active}(p))$ to the adversary.
<b>Upon receiving message ACCEPT(<math>s, s'</math>) from the adversary</b> : if there are two records $\text{init}(s, p)$ and $\text{init}(s', p')$ such that parties $p$ and $p'$ are feasible partners, then remove these records, generate a random key $k$ , record $\text{partner}(s', p', s, p, k)$ and write output $\text{ACCEPT}(p', k)$ to party $p$ . Else if there is a record $\text{partner}(s, p, s', p', k)$ then remove this record and write output $\text{ACCEPT}(p', k)$ to party $p$ .
<b>Upon receiving message IMPERSONATE(<math>s, p', k'</math>) from the adversary</b> : if there is a record $\text{init}(s, p)$ and party $p'$ is corrupted then remove this record, and write output $\text{ACCEPT}(p', k')$ to $p$ .
<b>Upon receiving message CORRUPT(<math>s</math>) from the adversary</b> : if there is a record $\text{init}(s, p)$ or $\text{partner}(s, p, s', p', k)$ such that $p$ is corruptible then mark $p$ as corrupted and remove $\text{state}(p)$ .

Fig. 2. Ideal anonymous authenticated key exchange

### 3.1 Anonymous Entity Authentication

Entity authentication is a process in which one party is assured of the identity of another party by acquiring corroborative evidence. Anonymous authentication is a special type of entity authentication where the identities of the communication parties remain private to third parties that may eavesdrop on their communication or even invoke and interact with the parties. In the UC framework, it is captured by the parties having ideal access to an anonymous entity authentication functionality, which we denote by  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{aauth}}$ . This functionality is presented in Figure 1.

*Parties* There are two types of protocol parties, **server** and **tag**. In each session, there is a single instance of a party of type **server** and arbitrarily many instances of type **tag**. The function  $\text{type}(p)$  returns the type of party  $p$  in the current session. The UC entities, such as adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  and the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ , are not parties per se, though the  $\mathcal{A}$  may control several protocol parties.

*Sessions* A single session spans the complete life-time (simulation instance) of our authentication scheme. It consists of many concurrent subsessions, which are initiated by protocol parties upon receiving input INITIATE from the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ . While the server and tags initiate subsessions, the adversary controls the concurrency and interaction between these subsessions. Two protocol parties are *feasible partners* in authentication if they are, respectively, a **server** and a **tag**. Upon successful completion of a subsession, each party accepts its corresponding partner as authenticated. The environment  $\mathcal{Z}$  may read the output tapes of the tags and server at any moment during the session, which terminates when the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$  stops. The environment  $\mathcal{Z}$  may contain many other sessions of arbitrary protocols, thus allowing our protocol to start and run concurrently with arbitrary others. All parties involved in a subsession of the authentication scheme are given a unique session identifier  $sid$  by the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ .

*Authenticity* Successful authentication in the real world is a result of sharing *common secrets*—one party can corroborate the values produced by another as functions of the shared secrets. The choice of authentication partners is decided by the real adversary, who has full control of the network. In the ideal world, this is emulated by invocations of the command ACCEPT, one for each partner. The true identity of the partner is given to the authenticating parties, regardless of the action of the adversary. This limits the adversary to invocation of the protocols and scheduling of the output of each party only.

<sup>2</sup> While the UC framework can accommodate unconditional security settings, we focus on computational security.

*Anonymity* The only information revealed to the adversary by the functionality is the type of the party, whether it is a **tag** or **server**. The difference between **tag** and **server** is observable since the real server always starts the protocol.

*Forward-security* The real adversary may corrupt activated tags—the server is considered incorruptible—obtaining keys and any persistent memory values. These may compromise the anonymity of the current subsession and earlier incomplete ones by the same corrupted party. In order to corrupt a tag not actively running, the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$  may request the tag to start a new subsession and then inform the adversary to corrupt it.

The effect of corruption in the ideal world, via command **CORRUPT**, is that the adversary can impersonate corrupted tags, via **IMPERSONATE** command. Upon corruption, the adversary may also link all incomplete subsessions of the same party, up to the last successfully completed, through acquiring knowledge of  $active(p)$ —the list of identifications of all preceding incomplete subsession, returned from the functionality after a **INITIATE** command. Once a subsession is successfully completed in the ideal world, this subsession and all earlier subsessions of the same party are protected against all future corruptions of any party. Therefore, the ideal world provides forward-security only for completed subsessions.

In the functionality,  $state(p)$  is the list of all subsession records maintained by the functionality concerning party  $p$  in the current session. This list is removed from the memory of ideal functionality up on corruption of the tag  $p$ , and effectively leaves control of the corrupted tag to the adversary. The only information retained is the fact that  $p$  is corrupted.

*Activation sequence* In our protocols and functionalities, the receiving party of any message or subroutine output is activated next. If no outgoing message or subroutine output is produced in the processing of an incoming message, then by convention the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$  is activated next.


### 3.2 Anonymous authenticated key-exchange

<b>Functionality <math>\mathcal{F}_{com}</math></b>
$\mathcal{F}_{com}$ has session identifier $sid$ . It only admits messages with the same $sid$ .
<b>Upon receiving input</b> CHANNEL <b>from party</b> $p$ : generate a unique channel identification $c$ , a record <b>Channel</b> ( $c, p$ ) and write output $c$ to and reactivate party $p$ .
<b>Upon receiving input</b> LISTEN( $c$ ) <b>from party</b> $p$ : if there is a record <b>Channel</b> ( $c, p$ ) then record <b>Listen</b> ( $c, p$ ) and send message <b>Listen</b> ( $c$ ) to the adversary.
<b>Upon receiving input</b> BROADCAST( $c, m$ ) <b>from party</b> $p$ : send message <b>Broadcast</b> ( $c, m$ ) to the adversary.
<b>Upon receiving message</b> DELIVER( $c, m$ ) <b>from the adversary</b> : if there is a record <b>Listen</b> ( $c, p$ ) then remove this record and write output $m$ to and reactivate party $p$ .

**Fig. 3.** Ideal anonymous communication

The functionality for anonymous key-exchange  $\mathcal{F}_{ake}$  is presented in Figure 2. This functionality is a fairly straightforward extension of  $\mathcal{F}_{auth}$ . Authentic keys are computed as an additional, private output at the result of a successful subsession.

$\mathcal{F}_{ake}$  is activated by an **INITIATE** input from a party belonging to the session. The list of existing subsessions since its last successfully completed subsession are released to the adversary via message  $init(s, type(p), active(p))$ , where  $s$  is a newly created subsession identification.  $\mathcal{F}_{ake}$  also stores locally the record  $init(s, p)$ .



**Fig. 4.** The ideal adversary  $\mathcal{S}$  for  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{aake}}$

Corruption is as in the entity authentication functionality. It is achieved by the adversary invoking the command `CORRUPT`. Again, successful authenticated key exchange in the real world is a result of sharing secrets. This is achieved in the ideal world by invocations of the command `ACCEPT` by the ideal adversary, one for each partner in the pair. This only succeeds if the two parties are both requesting authentication. Successful subsessions result in each party accepting the partner's true identity and generating a shared subsession key.

As before, the adversary can impersonate parties in the ideal world by invoking the command `IMPERSONATE`, which only succeeds if the impersonated party is corrupted.

*Session-key indistinguishability* The anonymous authenticated key-exchange functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{aake}}$  provides for session-key indistinguishability, in addition to all the security properties provided by  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{aauth}}$ . More specifically, if the adversary were to be given either (i) a random value, or (ii) a recently exchanged session key corresponding to a fresh authentication key, it could not distinguish the two cases. This is so because  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{aake}}$  generates session keys at random when the authentication key is fresh—i.e., being used for the first time since the last successful authentication session completed.

### 3.3 Wireless Communication

RFIDs are transponders that communicate in a wireless medium. In such a medium, communication has the potential of being anonymous, as location, network topology, and routing strategies do not disclose the identity of the communicating parties. Accordingly, our protocols require that only the type of a communicating party—server or transponder (tag)—is revealed through the use of communication.

Any RFID security protocol that provides anonymity must assume the existence of anonymous channels. To model this requirement in the UC framework, we introduce the ideal anonymous communication functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}$  (Figure 3). As the communication anonymity requirement applies to both the real and idealized protocols, our description of the real protocol in Section 4 also makes use of  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}$ .

## 4 Protocols

In this section we define two novel optimistic RFID authentication protocols: O-FRAP and O-FRAKE. Both protocols offer forward-anonymity, while requiring only minimal overhead when the system is not under attack. Our protocols rely on a trusted setup and on the wireless communication functionality described earlier.

These protocols are lightweight enough for RFID deployments, yet provide strong UC security and therefore are suitable in other ubiquitous application contexts, such as sensor networks. The only restriction is that the each component playing the role of a single tag must use separate keys when performing parallel authentications/key-exchanges.

### 4.1 Trusted Setup and the Server Database

The following trusted setup is done in a physically secure environment. For each tag, a fresh, unique key triple  $(r, k^a, k^b)$  is randomly generated and stored both at the tag and the server. The value  $r$  is a one-time-use pseudonym for the tag that is used for optimistic key-retrieval. Value  $k^a$  is the tag's authentication key (updated after each successful authentication), and  $k^b$  is a secondary, communication channel protection key that is re-computed after each successful authentication in the key-exchange variant of the protocol.

The tag stores the key triple in its non-volatile (re-writable) memory, while the server initializes a database  $D$  whose entries are of the form  $\langle i, previous_i, current_i \rangle$ . At setup,  $previous_i = (\perp, \perp, \perp)$ , while  $current_i = (r_i, k_i^a, k_i^b)$ . The server must maintain a pair of key triples for each tag to preserve consistency though key updates in the presence of active adversaries: Since the server computes the updated triple before the tag, an adversary could tamper with the communication channel and prevent the tag from computing the updated key. During an authentication attempt by the tag  $i$ , the server detects whether the tag is using  $previous_i$  or  $current_i$ . If the tag uses  $current_i$ , the server will replace  $previous_i$  with  $current_i$  and  $current_i$  with a newly computed value. If the tag uses  $previous_i$  instead, then  $current_i$  is replaced with newly computed value, while  $previous_i$  is preserved. This operation is denoted  $D.update(i)$ .

We assume that the database is (doubly) indexed by the values of the previous  $r_i$ , denoted  $previous_i(r)$ , and the current  $r_i$ , denoted  $current_i(r)$ . Therefore, database entries  $\langle i, previous_i, current_i \rangle$  can be efficiently retrieved from either value. We denote this operation by  $D.retrieve(r)$ .

### 4.2 RFID entity authentication


Our first protocol, O-FRAP, is an Optimistic Forward-secure RFID Authentication Protocol. In this protocol,  $r_{sys}$  and  $r_{tag}$  are values generated pseudo-randomly by the server and the tag, respectively, so as to anonymize the session and to prevent replays. The value  $r_{tag}$  is generated pseudo-randomly for optimistic identification of the tag. Value  $k_{tag}^a$  is the tag's current key and is updated by the server after the tag is authenticated, and by the tag after the server is authenticated.

On activation by the server, the tag computes four values  $\nu_1, \nu_2, \nu_3, \nu_4$  by applying the pseudo-random function  $F$  to  $(k_{tag}^a, r_{tag} || r'_{sys})$ . We use the following convention: If the sender writes the value  $x$  to a channel, it is observed as  $x'$  by the receiver. The value  $x'$  may differ from  $x$  if corrupted by the adversary while in transit.

In O-FRAP,  $\nu_1$  is used to update the pseudo-random value  $r_{tag}$ ;  $\nu_2$  is used for authentication of the tag;  $\nu_3$  is used to authenticate the server;  $\nu_4$  is used to update  $k_{tag}^a$ . In our protocols we use the following convention: the four values computed by the server by applying the pseudo-random function  $F$  to  $(k_j^a, r'_{tag} || r_{sys})$  are denoted by  $\nu_1^*, \nu_2^*, \nu_3^*, \nu_4^*$ . When the adversary is passive, these values correspond to the non-starred values. In particular  $\nu_2^* = \nu_2$  and  $\nu_3^* = \nu_3$ , and the server and tag output ACCEPT.

Observe that the tag key  $k_{tag}^a$  is updated after each server authentication, giving strong separation properties between sessions. In particular, if a tag is compromised, it cannot be linked to transcripts of earlier sessions. This guarantees forward-anonymity.

**Fig. 5.** O-FRAP and O-FRAKE: Optimistic Forward-secure RFID tag Authentication and Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols, respectively. O-FRAKE differs from O-FRAP only in the generation of an additional value to be used as session key (shown inside a box)



### 4.3 RFID authenticated key exchange

We next describe O-FRAKE, an Optimistic Forward-secure RFID Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol—see Figure 5. The protocol is essentially the same as O-FRAP except that five random values  $\nu_1, \nu_2, \nu_3, \nu_4, \nu_5$  are generated by the pseudo-random function  $F$ . The output value  $k_{tag}^b$  is an agreed sub-session key for securing the communication channel between the server and the tag, for example

to protect transmission of private information collected by the tag. Corruption or replacement of  $k_{tag}^b$  (either during the authentication protocol or during later use) is an attack on the exchanged key and has no effect on the authentication key  $k_{tag}^a$ . Furthermore, even if the adversary corrupts the tag, prior session keys are protected and prior session transcripts are unlinkable. This enforces separation of sessions and provides forward-anonymity, authenticity and secrecy.

## 5 Proof of security

**Theorem 1.** *O-FRAP and O-FRAKE UC-securely implements the anonymous RFID authentication and anonymous RFID authenticated key exchange ideal functionalities, respectively.*

*Proof.* We shall prove the theorem for O-FRAKE. O-FRAP then follows similarly. Observe that if  $F$  in the protocol is a true random function then the keys used in all fully completed tag subsessions are uniformly random and mutually independent. This means that conversations in fully completed tag subsessions are independently and identically distributed. The independence also holds for all subsessions separated by at least a fully completed subsession, where the key is refreshed. Our simulation is as follows:

- Simulate a copy  $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$  of the real adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , a copy  $\widehat{\text{server}}_s$  of the real server, a copy  $\widehat{\text{tag}}_s$  of a real tag for each tag subsession  $s$  and a copy  $\widehat{\mathcal{F}}_{\text{com}}$  of ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{com}}$  (Figure 3). Forward messages among simulated parties  $\{\widehat{\text{server}}, \widehat{\text{tag}}_s, \widehat{\mathcal{A}}, \widehat{\mathcal{F}}_{\text{com}}\}$  and also between  $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$  and  $\mathcal{Z}$  faithfully (Figure 5).
- The database  $\widehat{D}$  of  $\widehat{\text{server}}$  contains persistent keys of corrupted tags and transient keys of active tags. Keys are added to and removed from  $\widehat{D}$  on demand.
- The secret key of  $\widehat{\text{tag}}_s$  is copied from the immediately preceding incomplete subsession, if there is one, or is randomly generated, if the immediately preceding incomplete subsession of the tag is fully completed. This key is temporarily added to  $\widehat{D}$  during simulation of the subsession  $s$ , and is removed from  $\widehat{D}$  after successful completion of the subsession  $s$ .
- If  $\widehat{\text{tag}}_s$  is corrupted during the execution of subsession  $s$  then its key will be marked as corrupted and will never be removed from  $\widehat{D}$ . This allows corrupted tags to be impersonated by the adversary  $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$ . In this case, the corrupted key is updated accordingly to the protocol after each successful impersonation of  $\widehat{\text{tag}}_s$  by  $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$ .
- Emulate the externally visible part of the protocol, i.e., its interactions with  $\mathcal{Z}$ . More specifically, invoke  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ake}}$  with messages  $\text{CORRUPT}(s)$ ,  $\text{ACCEPT}(s, s')$  and  $\text{IMPERSONATE}(s, p')$ , when the real-world adversary corrupts a tag, forwards unmodified inputs between simulated tags and server, or impersonates simulated tags, respectively.

We describe the simulations in Figure 4. It is straightforward to verify that if the following two conditions hold then keys used in real executions and ideal simulations are statistically identical:

1.  $F$  is a truly random function.
2. Each verification done by the server succeeds with at most one key in the database.

Consequently, the real messages and the simulated messages are also statistically identical, i.e., the real and ideal world simulations are identical. The first condition fails if  $F$  is distinguishable from true random function. The second condition fails while the first holds if there are two keys that verify the random challenge  $r_{sys}$  and reply  $(\overline{r}_{tag}, \nu_2)$ . For each given tag subsession, this happens with probability at most  $n2^{1-\kappa}$ , where  $\kappa$  is the security parameter, i.e. the minimum bit length of  $r_{sys}$ ,  $\overline{r}_{tag}$  and  $\nu_2$ , and  $n$  is total number of tags managed by this server. Therefore the probability that the second fails while the first holds is at most  $nL2^{1-\kappa}$ , where  $L$  is the total number of tag subsessions. Since both conditions fail with negligible probabilities (as functions of the security parameter  $\kappa$ ), the real and ideal worlds are computationally indistinguishable by the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ .

The server and tags in our protocols are kept key-synchronized as follows. First, as the initiator of the protocol, the server is always at most one step ahead of the tag in updating the key. Therefore, if the server stores the previous value of the key until the new key value is observed in use by the corresponding tag, the protocol will accommodate tags that fail to update their keys due to interference by the adversary.

*Session identifiers* In our proof, we do not explicitly state the nature of the session identifier *sid*. We now rectify this. In the protocol in Figure 5, the *sid* provided by the UC framework includes the tag names and their corresponding keys  $k_i^a$ . This guarantees that the server and the tag share the same secret key in the same session. Without this trusted setup assumption, neither the security nor the functionality of our protocols is guaranteed.

*Security reduction and concrete complexity* A concrete security reduction must relate distinguishing real-vs-ideal worlds to distinguishing pseudo-vs-true randomness. To accomplish this, faithfully simulate the real world and use  $\mathcal{Z}$  as the distinguisher. When a truly random function  $F$  is used in the real simulation, we obtain exactly the ideal simulation, modulo a negligible probability event, namely that the second condition in the proof of Theorem 1 fails when  $F$  is truly random. Therefore, the advantage of distinguishing real from ideal is at most:

$$Adv_F(nL, T + nL) + nL2^{1-\kappa},$$

where  $Adv_F(q, t)$  is the advantage of distinguishing  $F$  from a true random function by making at most  $q$  queries to  $F$  and using at most  $t$  computational steps (execution time);  $L$  is the number of tag subsessions;  $n$  is the number of tags; and  $T$  is the combined time complexity of the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$  and the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ .

## 6 Lightweight constructions

In this section we show how to achieve a very efficient, practical construction of O-FRAP and O-FRAKE by using only a pseudo-random generator (PRG). Estimation of the hardware requirements of a prototypical specification are of the order of 2000 gates.

### 6.1 Lite pseudo-random function families

We describe how to achieve a very efficient, practical construction of large-length output pseudo-random function families. First, we design a large-length output pseudo-random function (PRF) from a fixed-length output PRF and a PRG. Using ideas from [21] one can then implement the protocols by using a PRG only. For the sake of completeness we include a proof of security of the lemma below.

**Lemma 1.** *If PRG is a pseudo-random generator and PRF is a pseudo-random function then  $F = PRG \circ PRF$  is a pseudo-random function.*

*Proof.* Let  $X, Y, W$ , and  $Z$  be efficiently sampleable domains and let  $PRF : X \times Y \rightarrow W$  be a pseudo-random function and  $PRG : W \rightarrow Z$  be a pseudo-random generator. We show that  $F = PRG \circ PRF : X \times Y \rightarrow Z$  is a pseudo-random function. Indeed, let  $y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n \in Y$  be distinct values and let  $x \in_R X$ . We show that  $\mathbf{z} = (F(x, y_1), \dots, F(x, y_n))$  is indistinguishable from a random vector in  $Z^n$ . Notice that  $F(x, y_i) = PRG(w_i)$  where  $w_i = PRF(x, y_i)$ . Since  $PRF$  is a pseudo-random function, the vector  $\mathbf{w} = (w_1, \dots, w_n)$  is pseudo-random in  $W^n$ . This implies that  $\mathbf{z} = (PRG(w_1), \dots, PRG(w_n))$  is indistinguishable from  $\mathbf{z}^* = (PRG(w_1^*), \dots, PRG(w_n^*))$ , where  $w_1^*, \dots, w_n^*$  are randomly and independently selected from  $W$ . By pseudo-randomness of the distribution of  $PRG(w_i^*)$  and the multi-sample indistinguishability theorem of Goldreich [20] and Yao [38],  $\mathbf{z}^*$  is indistinguishable from a random vector in  $Z^n$ .

## 6.2 Practical Implementation

For practical RFID implementations a very efficient hardware implementation of a *PRG* should be used. In general a *PRG* can be implemented much more efficiently than a standard cryptographic pseudo-random function. For instance, the shrinking generator<sup>3</sup> of Coppersmith, Krawczyk, and Mansour [17] can be implemented with fewer than 2000 gates with approximately 80-bit security [4], which is feasible for a wide range of RFID architectures. The best known attacks on the shrinking generator are not practical in this range of the security parameter [4]. Alternatively, other secure stream ciphers suitable for constrained hardware architectures could be used—some candidates have been submitted to the European eStream project [32]. However, designing such highly efficient stream ciphers remains challenging. For example, the proposed Grain [22] family of stream ciphers has recently been shown not to achieve full security [30].<sup>4</sup>

Standard cryptographic constructions, such as those based on HMAC (with the extra property that the cryptographic hash function in the construction should pseudo-random), or CBC-MAC with a block cipher (for instance, AES) would require around 10-15K gates. These constructions are suitable only for a narrow range of higher cost RFID tags. However, using our constructions, one obtains a full-fledged implementation of the O-FRAP and O-FRAKE protocols using approximately 2000–3000 gates, which covers a much wider range of RFID architectures.

## 7 Featherweight Authentication

In this section we consider a family of RFID authentication and key exchange protocols secure against fly-by attacks, named A-TRAP after Optimistic “Absolutely” Trivial RFID Authentication Protocols, to emphasize their minimalist structure and overhead. These protocols only require a PRG and a *Time-Delay Scheduler* (TDS).

The TDS is a very simple hardware device that controls the time-delay between authentication sessions. The time-delay is minimal, say  $t_0$ , between complete authentication sessions—i.e., sessions that terminate with the tag’s key update. After each incomplete session, the time delay is doubled. So, after  $m$  successive incomplete sessions there will be a time-delay of  $2^m t_0$ . The TDS is used to thwart attacks in which the adversary triggers incomplete sessions to desynchronize the key updates of the tag and the server. A limited number of time-delay doublings can be easily achieved using capacitors, acquiring enough energy before running the protocol, and/or counters. During this delay, the whole tag is powered down except for a counter and the clock rate is reduced to minimal, only enough to run the counter. These have the potentials to extend the delay by few orders of magnitude.

### 7.1 A-TRAP

A-TRAP is a mutual RFID authentication protocol in which, the tag and the server exchange values  $\nu_1, \nu_2, \nu_3$ , respectively, generated by the pseudo-random generator  $g_{tag}$ —see Figure 6. The server checks that the received value  $g'_{tag}$  is in its database  $D = \{d_{i,j}\}$ : if  $d_{i,j} = g'_{tag}$  then it accepts the tag as authentic. In this case it updates the  $i$ -th row of its directory  $D$  by: (a) discarding its first  $j$  entries, (b) shifting the remaining entries to the front, and finally (c), filling the empty cells with the next  $j$  values  $g_i^{(1)}, \dots, g_i^{(j)}$  extracted from the pseudo-random generator  $g_i$  (see Figure 7). If the value  $g'_{tag}$  is not in  $D$  then the tag is rejected. A variant of A-TRAP achieves authenticated key exchange by generating


<sup>3</sup> Using the shrinking generator requires care (buffering) to avoid the introduction of vulnerabilities to timing and side-channel attacks.

<sup>4</sup> The attack succeeds in  $O(2^{54})$  steps, while Grain promises 80-bit security. However, the attack requires considerable amount ( $O(2^{51})$  bits) of keystream (alternatively, plaintext/ ciphertext pairs), an unrealistic amount of data in the context of RFID applications.

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**Fig. 6.** A-TRAP: an Absolutely Trivial RFID Authentication or AKE Protocol. The AKE version uses an additional value, shown inside a box

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a fourth value  $\nu_4$  using the pseudo-random generator  $g_{tag}$ . The security of the A-TRAP protocol is discussed next.

## 7.2 Security considerations

A-TRAP protocols offer limited protection against desynchronization attacks: a tag that is “interrogated” more than an upper bound of  $m$  successive times will become permanently invalidated. However, for attacks that interact with a tag for a time period shorter than  $2^m t_0$  time units (a fly-by attack), these protocols offer provably secure authentication, forward-anonymity, availability, and key-indistinguishability. The A-TRAP protocols are therefore secure against attacks in which the adversary surreptitiously desynchronizes the tag (with a limited time budget for the attack), but will not protect against attacks in which a tag is captured.

## 8 Further considerations

In this paper we have not addressed attacks that exploit side-channel vulnerabilities of the tags. These attacks are likely avenues for corruption—e.g., extremely powerful power-analysis attacks that result in full key-recovery have been implemented against current RFID architectures [34]. Ultimately, the

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**Fig. 7.** The effect of  $D.\text{update}(i, j)$  in the A-TRAP server database

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$d_{1,1}$	$\dots$	$d_{1,m-j}$	$d_{1,m-j+1}$	$\dots$	$d_{1,m}$
$\vdots$		$\vdots$	$\vdots$		$\vdots$
$d_{i,j+1}$	$\dots$	$d_{i,m}$	$g_i^{(1)}$	$\dots$	$g_i^{(j)}$
$\vdots$		$\vdots$	$\vdots$		$\vdots$
$d_{n,1}$	$\dots$	$d_{n,m-j}$	$d_{n,m-j+1}$	$\dots$	$d_{n,m}$

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effectiveness of such attacks demonstrate that secure RFID applications will require advances beyond protocol design. It will be necessary to modify the physical characteristics of these devices to make them more shielded against side-channel cryptanalysis. However, by introducing protocols that achieve forward-security, we mitigate the consequences of corruption and key extraction: Our protocols guarantee that past, successful sessions remain anonymous and private after key compromise.

Our introduction of the ideal wireless functionality is a first step into capturing assumptions about lower network layers into the security analysis of RFID protocols. A natural extension of our work would be to relax the anonymity guarantees provided by  $\mathcal{F}_{com}$  to model information leaks by lower communication layers—including the physical layer where side-channel attacks operate. An interesting issue in this direction would be to determine the maximum side-channel leakage bandwidth that would still permit the design of anonymous authentication protocols with strong (and composable) security properties.

## 8.1 Conclusion

We present highly practical RFID authentication and authenticated key-exchange protocols that are provably secure in the Universal Composability framework, and that provide for forward-anonymity, authenticity, availability, and session-key indistinguishability.

Additionally, we describe how to implement our protocols using only pseudo-random generators. Therefore, the proposed implementations are feasible for a wide range of RFID architectures.

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