Paper 2007/026

Cryptanalysis and Improvement of an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol

Shengbao Wang, Zhenfu Cao, Maurizio Adriano Strangio, and Lihua Wang

Abstract

In SAC'05, Strangio proposed protocol ECKE-1 as an efficient elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman two-party key agreement protocol using public key authentication. In this letter, we show that despite the author's claims protocol ECKE-1 is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation attacks. We also present an improved protocol --- ECKE-1N, which can withstand such attacks. The improved protocol's performance is comparable to the well-known MQV protocol and maintains the same remarkable list of security properties.

Note: In this letter, we propose an authenticated key agreement protocol whose performance is comparable to the well-known (H)MQV protocol. The new protocol can also be seen as a (secure) descendant of the famous MTI/C0 protocol.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Publication info
Published elsewhere. IEEE Communications Letters
Keywords
Key agreementelliptic curve cryptographyDiffie--Hellman protocolkey-compromise impersonationMQV
Contact author(s)
shengbao-wang @ cs sjtu edu cn
History
2007-12-14: last of 4 revisions
2007-01-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2007/026
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/026,
      author = {Shengbao Wang and Zhenfu Cao and Maurizio Adriano Strangio and Lihua Wang},
      title = {Cryptanalysis and Improvement of an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/026},
      year = {2007},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/026}
}
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