Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2007/002

Cryptanalysis of An Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation Protocol Based On Polynomial Reconstruction Problem

Huang Lin and Zhenfu Cao

Abstract: In 1999, Naor and Pinkas \cite {NP99} presented a useful protocol called oblivious polynomial evaluation(OPE). In this paper, the cryptanalysis of the OPE protocol is presented. It's shown that the receiver can successfully get the sender's secret polynomial $P$ after executing the OPE protocol only once, which means the privacy of the sender can be violated and the security of the OPE protocol will be broken. It's also proven that the complexity of the cryptanalysis is the same with the corresponding protocols cryptanalyzed.

Category / Keywords: oblivious polynomial evaluation; polynomial reconstruction problem; cryptanalysis

Date: received 1 Jan 2007, withdrawn 10 Jan 2007

Contact author: faustlin at sjtu edu cn

Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)

Note: There is an error in this paper.

Version: 20070111:024712 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2007/002

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