Paper 2006/464

Remarks on "Analysis of One Popular Group Signature Scheme'' in Asiacrypt 2006

Giuseppe Ateniese, Jan Camenisch, Marc Joye, and Gene Tsudik

Abstract

In \cite{Cao}, a putative framing ``attack'' against the ACJT group signature scheme \cite{ACJT00} is presented. This note shows that the attack framework considered in \cite{Cao} is \emph{invalid}. As we clearly illustrate, there is \textbf{no security weakness} in the ACJT group signature scheme as long as all the detailed specifications in \cite{ACJT00} are being followed.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
ateniese @ cs jhu edu
History
2006-12-15: last of 2 revisions
2006-12-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/464
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/464,
      author = {Giuseppe Ateniese and Jan Camenisch and Marc Joye and Gene Tsudik},
      title = {Remarks on "Analysis of One Popular Group Signature Scheme'' in Asiacrypt 2006},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/464},
      year = {2006},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/464}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/464}
}
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