Paper 2006/464
Remarks on "Analysis of One Popular Group Signature Scheme'' in Asiacrypt 2006
Giuseppe Ateniese, Jan Camenisch, Marc Joye, and Gene Tsudik
Abstract
In \cite{Cao}, a putative framing ``attack'' against the ACJT group signature scheme \cite{ACJT00} is presented. This note shows that the attack framework considered in \cite{Cao} is \emph{invalid}. As we clearly illustrate, there is \textbf{no security weakness} in the ACJT group signature scheme as long as all the detailed specifications in \cite{ACJT00} are being followed.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Contact author(s)
- ateniese @ cs jhu edu
- History
- 2006-12-15: last of 2 revisions
- 2006-12-08: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/464
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/464, author = {Giuseppe Ateniese and Jan Camenisch and Marc Joye and Gene Tsudik}, title = {Remarks on "Analysis of One Popular Group Signature Scheme'' in Asiacrypt 2006}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/464}, year = {2006}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/464} }