Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/454
How to Win the Clone Wars: \\ Efficient Periodic n-Times Anonymous Authentication
Jan Camenisch and Susan Hohenberger and Markulf Kohlweiss and Anna Lysyanskaya and Mira Meyerovich
Abstract: We create a credential
system that lets a user anonymously authenticate at most $n$ times in
a single time period. A user withdraws a dispenser of $n$ e-tokens.
She shows an e-token to a verifier to authenticate herself; each
e-token can be used only once, however, the dispenser automatically
refreshes every time period.
The only prior solution to this problem,
due to Damgård et al.~[DDP05], uses protocols that are a factor of $k$ slower for the user and verifier, where $k$ is the security parameter.
Damgård et al. also only support one authentication per time
period, while we support $n$. Because our construction is based on
e-cash, we can use existing techniques to identify a cheating user,
trace all of her e-tokens, and revoke her dispensers. We also offer a
new anonymity service: glitch protection for basically honest users
who (occasionally) reuse e-tokens. The verifier can always recognize
a reused e-token; however, we preserve the anonymity of users who do
not reuse e-tokens too often.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / electronic commerce and payment, e-cash
Publication Info: Full version of an extended abstract published in Proceedings of ACM CCS 2006, ACM Press.
Date: received 30 Nov 2006, last revised 11 Apr 2007
Contact author: mira at cs brown edu
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20070412:012739 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2006/454
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